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Introduction
The banking sector, and the whole financial sector more generally, is one of the most regulated sectors of the economy because of reasons linked to systemic risk and consumer protection. In most countries its regulation dates back to well before the introduction of competition policy. Given this peculiarity and the idea that competition is detrimental to stability, competition in the banking sector was basically suppressed until financial market liberalization started in the US in the 1970s and continued later on in Europe. Since the beginning of the liberalization process, several important banking crises have occurred (in diverse places like the US (S&Ls), Scandinavia, Spain, and the recent one derived from the subprime crisis).
Special provisions in the application of competition policy to the banking sector remained also long after the start of the liberalization process. For example, until December 2005 competition policy was applied in Italy by the central bank rather than by the competition authority. Similarly, in the Netherlands the banking sector was exempted by competition policy until 2000, two years later than the other sectors. In contrast, neither the European Treaty nor the merger regulation include special provisions for banking, with the only exception of the provision of art. 21 of the merger regulation that leaves Member States the possibility to protect legitimate interests such as prudential control. The important question -which we address in this paper-is to which extent competition policy has been applied in practice, and how competition policy has affected the development of regulation and the stability of the sector.
Several aspects can make competition policy prominent in banking. Indeed, the banking sector is important because of its weight in the economy and because it is crucial to provide finance to firms. Financial firms often need to collaborate (e.g. in payment systems) and this may raise competition issues. Finally, there are concerns that the implementation of the single financial market in the EU is being slow and that this may hinder competition. 1 The paper starts with a brief review of the academic literature on competition and stability in banking, discussing the rationale for regulating the banking sector in Section 2, the competitive mechanisms specific to the sector in Section 3, and the potential tradeoff between competition and stability in Section 4. The discussion highlights how the literature is moving away from the traditional view that competition hurts stability.
However, results are still too inconclusive to generate clear policy implications except for the need to enforce competition policy in banking.
After doing that, the paper describes the normative arrangements of competition policy in the banking sector in Europe in Section 5; and in Section 6 it reviews the most important cases analyzed by the Commission in the financial sector. Given the structure of the financial sector across Europe, mergers and cartels have played so far a much greater role. We first describe the evolution of the concentration process in Section 6.1 and then look in Section 6.2 at cases which involved conflicts between the Commission and the Member States. Concerning cartels we review in Section 6.3 the so-called "Lombard Club" in Austria, various cases involving Visa International and the recent examination against the Groupement des Cartes Bancaires. Then, in Section 6.4 we move to the description of the case of abuse of dominance position investigated by the Commission against Clearstream. Finally in Section 6.5 we turn to state aid, and describe the two important cases of Credit Lyonnais and of the capital transfers to the German Landesbanken in the early 80s. It is in the area of state aid that stability and competition considerations come directly into play and restructuring of banks in financial difficulties assumes a special connotation. Before concluding we turn in Section 7 to the issues of financial integration and current developments in financial regulation and supervision, 1 Competition problems may also arise in trading, securities services and the organization of exchanges. Those, however, are out of the scope of the present paper. 4 and describe the main results of the enquiries that the Commission conducted in the financial sector.
Several messages are derived in Section 8. In line with the developments in the academic literature, it emerges that competition policy is now taken seriously in the financial sector. The European Commission has by now examined cases in all areas of antitrust and has adopted important, landmark decisions. It has opposed anticompetitive mergers and has contrasted the attempt to pursue national protectionism by certain Member States as well as forms of cooperation in pricing schemes and in credit card systems. Also, the Commission has underlined how regulatory measures imposing for example minimum capital requirements cannot justify the granting of state aid to financial institutions if they entail distortions of competition. In this sense, the Commission has opposed both anticompetitive behavior and protectionism that in many cases is encouraged directly by national regulators or governmental authorities.
Still much remains to be understood in terms of the relation and balance between competition and stability. The concern that regulation can act as a barrier to competition and the difficulty of understanding the working of competition in a highly regulated environment where economic aspects like asymmetric information, switching costs and network externalities are present needs both further research and special attention in the application of competition policy.
Regulation in the banking sector: Rationale and instruments
It is well known that banks are special because they are more vulnerable to instability than firms in other sectors, and because people hold a non-negligible share of their wealth in bank deposits.
2 Instability can originate from the liability side or the asset side of banks. The former is related to runs and systemic crises; the latter to the excessive risk that banks can take in their investment decisions because of the high leverage and opaque 2 See Carletti (2008) and Carletti and Hartmann (2002) for a review of the issues discussed in Sections 2-4.
5
assets. This is particularly the case when deposits are insured, because deposit rates are insensitive to banks' risk exposure.
Runs can be related to panics or arise from fundamentals. As shown by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , panic bank runs are random events linked to self-fulfilling prophecies.
Given the assumption of first-come-first-served and the low liquidation value of the long term assets, there are multiple equilibria. If all depositors believe that a panic will not occur, only the consumers in need of early consumption withdraw their funds and their demands are satisfied. In contrast, if depositors believe a crisis will occur, all of them rush to avoid being last in the line. Which of these two equilibria occurs depends on extraneous variables or "sunspots". Although sunspots have no effect on the real data of the economy, they affect depositors' beliefs in a way that turns out to be self-fulfilling.
The key issue in the panic approach is the equilibrium selection. There is no real account of what triggers a crisis. This is particularly a problem for policy analysis. Ways to get around the multiplicity of equilibria are suggested by Postlewaite and Vives (1987) , and, more recently, by Rochet and Vives (2004) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , who use the techniques of global games to generate a unique equilibrium.
The fundamental view of bank runs asserts that crises are linked to the business cycle (e.g., Gorton, 1988) . When the economy goes into recession, the returns on bank assets will be low. If depositors receive information about the impending downturn, they anticipate banks' financial difficulties and try to withdraw their funds early. Given their liabilities are fixed, banks may be unable to remain solvent. Thus, crises are a response to unfolding economic circumstances.
Runs may trigger a systemic crisis. The propagation, or contagion, can occur through the interbank market, the payment system or through asset prices. The latter may lead to contagion also across different sectors, as shown in Carletti (2006, 2008) in a context where markets are incomplete and asset prices are determined by the available liquidity or in other words by the "cash in the market".
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Systemic risk and consumer protection are the main rationales for the introduction of safety net arrangements in the form of deposit insurance and lender of last resort. Deposit insurance prevents the occurrence of panic runs while maintaining banks' ability to provide liquidity insurance (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) .
The issue of the optimal form of central bank intervention has long been debated.
According to the "classic" view (Bagehot, 1873) , central banks should lend freely at a penalty rate and against good collateral. This should guarantee that the lender of last resort (LOLR) is only used for illiquid banks and in emergency circumstances. In practice, however, it is difficult, even for central banks, to distinguish illiquidity from insolvency. Banks in need of LOLR are under a suspicion of insolvency since they could otherwise raise funds from the market. As long as markets are sufficient to deal with systemic liquidity crises, there should be no need for central bank's loans to individual banks. However, the interbank market may fail, as it has happened in the recent subprime crisis and then help to individual banks makes sense (as explained in Rochet and Vives, 2004) .
A related aspect in this debate concerns the potential negative effects of the safety net arrangements. The main argument is that they worsen the problem of excessive risk taking and call for further regulatory measures in the form, for example, of minimum capital requirements. Moreover, the form of central bank intervention is important for competition policy. Direct subsidies or bailouts of financial institutions fall into the category of state aid and have a direct impact on the application of competition policy to the banking sector.
Competition in the banking sector
Analyzing competition in the banking sector is quite complicated. On the one hand, the standard competitive paradigm does not work because of features like asymmetric information in corporate relationships, switching costs and networks in retail banking. On the other hand, some banks' specificities, like the fact that they compete for loans and deposits, can lead to departures from the competitive outcome as banks may want to corner one market to achieve monopoly in the other. Broecker (1990) analyzes how competition in the credit market affects the screening of borrowers by banks when borrowers are of heterogeneous quality and screening tests are imperfect. The main result is that competition worsens the "winner's curse" problem as a higher loan rate tends to worsen the quality of firms accepting the loan. Increasing the number of banks reduces firms' average credit-worthiness and raises the probability that a bank does not grant any loan. In the limit, the equilibrium maintains some degree of oligopolistic competition. The lower quality of borrowers as competition increases implies also an increase of loan rates to compensate for the higher portfolio risk (Marquez, 2002) ; but not when information acquisition is endogenous, since in this case banks acquire information to soften competition and more competition reduces the winner's curse problem (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006) . The presence of adverse selection affects also the structure of the industry, as it generates endogenous entry barriers and leads to equilibria with blockaded entry, where only a finite number of banks is active (Dell'Ariccia et al., 1999; Dell'Ariccia, 2001) .
Switching costs are an important source of market power in retail banking. In moving from one bank to another, consumers incur costs associated with the physical change of accounts, bill payments or lack of information (Vives, 2001a) . The competitive effects of switching costs are twofold. On the one hand, they lead to the exercise of market power once banks have established a customer base which remains locked in. On the other hand, they induce fierce competition to enlarge the customer base. Thus, switching costs may lead banks to offer high deposit rates initially to attract customers and to reduce them subsequently, when consumers are locked in. Different results may however be obtained when switching costs are combined with asymmetric information about borrowers' creditworthiness (Bouckaert and Degryse; 2004) .
Finally, the presence of networks also affects the degree of competition as it introduces elements of non-price competition in the interaction among banks. For example, the 8 possibility for banks of sharing Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) networks can be used as strategic variable to affect price competition on the deposit market and foreclose any potential entrant (Matutes and Padilla, 1994) . A similar conclusion can be reached in frameworks where banks decide to offer remote access to their customers, such as postal or telephone services, in order to introduce vertical differentiation between banks and reduce the degree of horizontal differentiation (Degryse, 1996) .
One important final note is that competition in networks can also be analyzed in twosided markets. Rochet and Tirole (2002) analyze this issue in the context of credit card associations, where customers' banks and merchants have market power, and consumers and merchants decide rationally whether to buy or accept credit cards. As in the ATM literature, merchants can use card acceptance to increase customer base and relax price competition. Differently from the ATM literature, however, the system has to attract two sides of the market, i.e., issuers and acquirers, merchants and consumers. Thus, changes in interchange fees and prices affect the relative price structure of the two sides with important consequences on the equilibrium outcome.
In summary, competition in banking is imperfect and there are many frictions and barriers to entry which may generate rents. 3 In retail banking switching costs for customers are very important; and reputation and branch networks act as entry barriers. In corporate banking established relationships and asymmetric information are relevant frictions that explain why the market for small and medium sized firms remains local.
Electronic banking pushes in the direction of contestability, but it is also subject to exogenous and endogenous switching costs. In other segments of banking, like wholesale and investment banking, competition is at the international level and may be fierce. The analysis of the potential trade-off between competition and stability has gained significant importance in the academic literature in the last decade. Despite this, the results are still not completely conclusive.
Some studies have shown that coordination failures and panic runs can occur independently of the degree of competition in the market. In a model with elements of product differentiation, network externalities and possibility of bank failures, Matutes and Vives (1996) show that depositors have self-fulfilling perceptions of banks' success probabilities that lead to multiple equilibria. One equilibrium sees no banks being active.
This is due to a coordination problem among depositors, which occurs irrespectively of the degree of competition in the deposit market. However, by raising deposit rates, more competition may exacerbate the coordination problem among depositors. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , deposit insurance eliminates the non-banking equilibrium and stabilizes the system, but it is not always welfare-enhancing.
Following the empirically findings in Keeley (1990) of a negative effect of higher charter values on risk taking, the theoretical literature has initially stressed how competition worsens banks' incentives to take risk (e.g., Allen and Gale, 2004) and how regulation can help in mitigating this perverse link (e.g., Hellmann et al., 2000; Matutes and Vives, 2000) . The general idea is that greater competition reduces banks' charter values (or rents available to shareholders and/or managers). This increases the attractiveness of the gains from taking risks, and therefore the incentives to exploit the non-convexity in banks' payoff functions.
This result implies the need of regulating the banking system to limit the adverse consequences of intense competition and achieve stability. One possibility is to limit competition directly through ceilings on interest rates or limits on entry. Another possibility is to design regulation so to "correct" the negative effects of competition on banks' risk taking. Risk-adjusted deposit insurance premia or appropriate capital requirements may be sufficient for this purpose, even though, depending on the circumstances, they may need to be complemented by interest rate ceilings or entry restrictions (Matutes and Vives, 2000) .
Although the view of a detrimental relationship between competition and stability remains pervasive, some recent studies have suggested that such a relationship needs not be robust, For example, when entrepreneurs -and not banks-choose the risk of the investment project, greater competition in the loan market reduces entrepreneurs' incentives to take risks, thus implying also safer portfolios for banks (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005 ; and also Caminal and Matutes, 2002) . If competition has an ambiguous effect on stability, the role of regulation needs rethinking. Boot and Marinc (2007) analyze the impact of capital regulation on entry and bank monitoring. The main insight of the analysis is that when banks are heterogeneous in quality and compete for market share, increasing capital requirements leads to more entry into banking. Competition improves the monitoring incentives of better quality banks and deteriorates the incentives for lower quality banks.
All in all it seems plausible to expect that, once a certain threshold is reached, an increase in the level of competition will tend to increase risk-taking incentives and the probability 
Competition policy in the banking sector in the European Union
We now turn to the institutional design of competition policy for the banking sector.
Before the liberalization process the status quo was far away from the optimal balance between the benefits of competition (in terms of efficiency, quality provision, innovation and international competitiveness) and the potential increase in instability. Regulation The European Commission did not apply the old articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty till the Zuechner case in the early 1980s. This was because banking was seen as a special sector, where business was heavily influenced by the monetary and financial policies of member state authorities, in particular central banks and supervisors, rather than by market forces (Ghezzi and Magnani, 1998) .
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In line with the evolution at the European level the design of competition policy in banking has been substantially strengthened also at the national level and many Whereas it is plausible to assume a more lenient approach toward market power in banking, it remains unclear whether the presumption that stability considerations should override competition concerns is warranted. The question is rather to which extent stability considerations should influence the design of competition policy. Relatively to 13 the European framework, one wonders also whether, given the level of integration of financial markets and the supranational effects of mergers examined by the Commission, the stability exception should rather be implemented by some kind of supranational authority. This issue is related to the current debate of whether a European banking regulator is needed (see, e.g., Vives, 2001b) , also in light of the attempt of some Member
States to use the stability exception to put obstacles to financial integration.
The application of competition policy to the banking sector in the European

Union
Given the market structure of the banking sector, mergers and cartels have played so far a much greater role in the application of competition policy in Europe. Concerning the former, we distinguish between cases leading to competitive considerations and crossborder cases in which factors other than competitive considerations played an important role.
Mergers
The banking industry has experienced an important process of consolidation in the last two decades. The number and the size of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have increased substantially in most European countries. This process has taken place mostly at the domestic level, increasing substantially the levels of concentration in most countries such as Belgium, France, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the UK (see Table 1 and Figure 1 ). of the competition authorities. In the US, as well as in the UK, there is a concern about the effect of consolidation on retail banking and, in particular, on lending to SME. Prager and Hannan (1998) provide evidence that horizontal mergers of US banks in the period 1991-94 increase market power.
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In the UK concerns about market power in the payments system also have lead to its regulation by the Office of Fair Trading. As Jacob Wallenberg, SEB chairman put it, this case "(…) shows that in a small country you can become dominant so quickly that it's very difficult to create strong entities with the efficiencies that allow you to take steps into a larger market place." (FT, 20 September 2001) . This raises the need to look towards cross-border mergers to realize economies of scale once competition policy in banking is taken seriously by either domestic or EU authorities. In this sense competition authorities become a major player in the restructuring of the sector in the EU (see Vives, 2005) .
The interaction between the EU competition authority and Member States in cross border bank mergers
Differently from domestic mergers, cross-border mergers do not entail substantial anticompetitive effects. However, they can -and have been -subject to regulatory and supervisory obstacles through the provisions of art. 21 of the merger regulation.
The "seminal" case in this respect was the attempt by Banco Santander Central Hispano Netherlands because of overlap with Fortis (which was perceived to be an aggressive competitor in those markets). In this case it is notable that the Dutch supervisor did not put obstacles to a cross-border acquisition that has as objective to partition the local bank and integration by pieces in the three acquirers.
The cases described above show how Member States can abuse the provision of art. 21 (3) so to protect and strengthen national interests. This is further worsened by the potential discretion embedded in the supervisory control. Until recently, the national supervisory regulations for the prudential assessment of mergers and acquisitions lacked specificities in terms of the evaluation criteria, procedural rules and -in most cases-transparency; and, according to a survey conducted by the Commission in April 2005, the "misuse of supervisory powers" represented one of the main obstacles to cross-border consolidation.
Competition policy can therefore play a crucial role not only in watching and preventing excessive market power, but also in limiting the discretion and power of national supervisors. This claim is also supported by the empirical results in Carletti et al. (2007) that the opaqueness of the supervisory control of M&As leads to inefficiencies in the supervisory process that can be at least partly removed by strengthening merger control. Although this directive represents an important step in addressing the problems embedded in the supervisory control, it fails to ensure sufficient transparency. The approach concerning the disclosure of the negative decisions still leaves much to the discretion of the supervisory authorities and has the potential of reintroducing supervisory obstacles in the consolidation process (Kerjean, 2008) . Only if these obstacles are removed, the natural pecking order of consolidation first via national mergers, then regional (geographically nor by cultural affinity), and finally fully international can proceed (see Vives, 2005) .
Cartels
The most important cartel in the banking sector examined by the Commission is the so- As a consequence, Morgan Stanley withdrew its complaint but the Commission still went ahead and fined Visa.
In October 2007 the Commission intervened against the Groupement des Cartes
Bancaires under art. 81 of the Treaty. The Groupement managed the system of payments by "CB" card which accounts for over 70% of card payments in France. The examination concerned some price measures adopted by the Groupement which hindered the issuing of cards in France at competitive rates by certain member banks. In particular, banks that
were not "sufficiently" active in terms of acquisition of merchants or installation of ATM had to pay a fee of up to €11 on each card issued. These measures were motivated by the need to combat free-riding on the investments made by the main incumbent banks and to encourage new competitors to be fully active on both sides of the market. The
Commission found, however, that these measures, although applicable in principle to all members, had been applied only against certain, smaller members thus restricting competition in the French payment card market. Since the Groupement had voluntarily notified the measures to obtain a decision of compatibility with the competition rules, the Commission ordered the annulment of the current measures and the prohibition to impose similar ones in the future without imposing any fine. It can be argued, however, whether the Commission in its analysis took proper account of the two-sided nature of the credit card market (issuing cards and acquiring merchants). Indeed, in a two-sided market for a practice to be anti-competitive it has to be shown that it constitutes a barrier to entry to the system and not only to one side of the market (since a barrier on one side may encourage entry on the other side).
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All these cases make clear the determination of the Commission to pursue price fixing and exclusion agreements in the banking sector, in particular when they go against the creation and functioning of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). Such behavior contrasts with the previous approach of some national regulators that supported and even encouraged collusion and rent creation among banks with the aim of avoiding disruptions and preserving a stable system. But what is the best approach? Should competition rules be applied fully to the banking sector or should the persecution of cartels be more lenient in the banking sector? Does price fixing enhance stability? Most of the academic literature suggests that some market power is beneficial for stability, but most likely there are more efficient ways of preserving stability than price fixing. Competition should be fostered and stability should be maintained with an efficient prudential framework and adequate arrangements for crises resolution.
4. Abuse of dominant position
The Commission examined only one case of abuse in the financial system so far in See Rochet and Tirole (2003) for an analysis of two-sided markets, and Wright (2004) for the dangers of using one-sided logic to two-sided markets.
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CASCADE RS, an IT platform through which it provides clearing and settlement services for registered shares issued in Germany, for more than two years till November 2001.
Also, between January 1997 and January 2004, Clearstream charged a higher per transaction price to Euroclear Bank than to other security depositories outside Germany.
The Commission recognized that both behaviors constituted an abuse of dominant position in terms of refusal to supply and price discrimination, which impaired Euroclear
Bank's ability to provide a comprehensive and innovative pan-European service in the downstream market for cross border clearing and settlement of EU securities. The negative decision was adopted although the infringements had already come to an end in order to clarify the legal situation in an evolving and important market for European integration like clearing and settlement services.
State aid
State aid includes all forms of guarantees granted directly by the State, i.e., by central, The two landmark cases examined show the commitment of the Commission not to let uncontrolled aid to the banking sector proceed without check. The aim is to reach an appropriate balance with the legitimate objective to preserve financial stability. The doubt remains, however, whether the granted aids were the least costly methods of preserving the receiving institutions. In this respect, it is important to evaluate also the future effects of state aid in terms of risk taking and moral hazard problems for the institution receiving the subsidy as well as for its competitors for which, as found by Gropp et al. (2006) , this negative potential effect seems to be even more severe. Nonetheless, the existing framework does not provide yet a level playing field for financial institutions across Europe and financial integration is not yet fully achieved.
Integration and liberalization in
Considerable cross-country differences persist in the legal and regulatory framework for financial institutions' operations mainly because of remaining national discretion. Apart from stability concerns, the lack of convergence implies a high regulatory burden for cross-border financial institutions.
Financial integration has progressed slowly and unevenly across different activities and segments. It is high in wholesale banking and in certain areas of corporate finance (especially in public corporate bond issuance and private equity markets), modest in some relationship aspects of banking and low in retail banking, particularly in loans to consumers (Barros et al., 2005 and ECB, 2007b) . Retail banking is the most important According to the Commission all these elements contribute to restrict entry, charge higher 30 fees, put obstacles to passing over lower fees or costs to cardholders, sustain market power, and prevent efficient operations.
Concerning the retail banking product markets, the Commission stressed how the conjunction of sustained high profitability, high market concentration and evidence of entry barriers raises concerns about banks' ability to influence the level of prices for consumers and small firms in some Member States. The presence of credit registers, holding confidential data that lenders use to set loan rates, may be used to exclude new entrants to retail banking markets. Some forms of cooperation among banks, as those taking place among savings and cooperative banks, can reduce competition and deter market entry. The widespread practice of product tying can reduce customer choice and increase banks' power in influencing prices. Finally, the presence of high switching costs can lead to high profit margins for banks.
Some of the concerns expressed in the Commission's inquiry are certainly legitimate although it has to be stressed that the existence of high profits is not per se the symptom of lack of competition. The analysis should center on the sources of market power like exogenous and endogenous switching costs and practices such as tying. Furthermore, in two-sided markets, such as payment cards, care must be taken to conduct a proper analysis that deals with their specificities.
Concluding remarks
Banking is no longer an exception in the enforcement of competition policy rules. This is as it should be, since the provision of a competitive "financial input" in the production process is crucial for the competitiveness of an economy. Given the fragility of the financial system, however, there may be a potential trade-off between competition and stability. Although recent theories have questioned such a trade-off, it remains unclear whether competition policy should be more lenient with market power in the banking industry. This applies, for example, to the evaluation of mergers. The reason is that market power may have a moderating effect on the incentives to take risk. The question of whether a certain, implicit or explicit, "banking exception" in competition policy will remain is therefore still open.
Two other reasons explain the attention of antitrust authorities to the sector. The first is that financial institutions tend to enter into collaborative agreements (this is the case for example, in credit cards or clearing and settlement systems). The second is that, as we have seen, many financial markets remain segmented in Europe and competition is perceived to be weak. Although clearly competition policy should aim at improving consumer welfare rather than forcing integration per se, it has a crucial role in keeping markets open. The lifting of artificial impediments to cross border mergers will permit to have large, well diversified institutions without having excessive market power in any market. This is the area where regulatory changes should concentrate most, and where competition policy has and should be used to prevent artificial and unjustified barriers to financial integration based on a misuse of supervisory powers. In this respect, it is also questionable that in an integrated financial market and monetary area prudential matters stay in national hands, particularly for EU-wide institutions (see Vives, 2001b ). This undermines the rationale for the prudential exception to protect a legitimate national interest. However, care should be taken since cross-border mergers may be a substitute for direct entry and could end up with large institutions meeting in different European markets raising tacit collusion concerns because of this multi-market contact.
